In this paper there is a short presentation of the extended system of mirror neurons and Michael Tomasello's theory of imitation. Imitation is the minimal change in human behaviour relative to other primates necessary for the emergence of meta-cognitive abilities. Emergence is here taken as in the theory of dynamic systems, where it is shown that local interaction between two individuals might spread in a community and cause the emergence of a global structure qualitatively different from the local one. Imitation and mirroring secure that an individual has an internal motor representation of observed behaviour. In a situation where humans develop an extended sense of force-dynamic manipulation of the material world this leads to representations of different strategies for the same goal, which stimulates the development of choice making mechanisms. We can therefore see the metacognitive monitoring of strategic behaviour as inherent in the dynamics determined by imitation and the mirror system.
Introduction
This paper is about the neuro-cognitive precondition for the development of the kind of consciousness that is implied in choice making or in a situation where an agent fails in doing some task and therefore has to change behavioural strategy. The assumption in this paper is that major properties of human cognition are system inherent in the sense that they develop as a consequence of the local interaction between the agents of a larger population. From an evolutionär}' perspective, this means we cannot consider the development of consciousness, language and other meta-cognitive abilities as isolated phenomena; instead these abilities develop dynamically as a result of changes in the local behaviour displayed by the individual when meeting other individuals. This kind of consideration follows the insights from catastrophe theory where it is shown that global structure can be an emergent property of local dynamics, cf. René Thorn (1972) ; we therefore have to hypothesize what kind of changes in local behaviour cause the development of the meta-cognitive abilities we normally ascribe to humans.
Following Tomasello (1999) , I present a set of minimal changes in the behaviour two individuals display when meeting; changes which occurred in the evolution from non-human primates to humans, and which are necessary for the development of meta-cognition, and symbolic representations (and thereby consciousness). It is generally the case for all species that when two individuals meet they modify each other's behaviour. If the population is large, then this local dynamic between two individuals can spread and have a rather large effect on the global structure, this is what in catastrophe theory is normally called the emergence of structure in a dynamic system. It also follows from this property of dynamic systems that a minimal change in the dynamics of local interaction might have a significant and unexpected global effect. Tomasello's theory deals with the minimal local interactions that can lead to the emergence of metacognition and culture, and referencing it to neuro-science I will also present a hypothesis about the minimal changes in brain structure that might bring about the type of behaviour Tomasello points out.
In describing the properties of the local dynamics that might cause the emergence of meta-cognitive abilities I will refer to Tomasello's notion of imitation as a decisive factor. Humans have a tendency to imitate other humans' motor as well as expressive behaviour. This constitutes a dynamic system and one can argue that certain global features of human culture are consequences of this system and can therefore be considered as system inherent properties. I will furthermore argue that certain meta-cognitive abilities of the individual are also emergent properties of the local imitation dynamic that takes place between two individuals. The necessary change in brain structure supporting the development of a disposition to imitate is likely to be connected to the newly found mirror system in the brain. However, the mirror system is not particular to humans, in fact it was discovered in the macaque apes, so if imitation is connected to mirror neurons this has to be because of a new exploitation of this system, not found in non-human primates. One can argue that this is linked with the development of the frontal parts of the brain with an extended ability to make comparisons and to make choices, i.e. related to the development of consciousness.
Dynamics and emergent properties
Emergent structure appears in biology when the following conditions are satisfied: a) we need a very large population of entities where each singular entity can be in one of more states, for instance moving versus non-moving, b) Viewed in isolation each entity changes state randomly, i.e. given the state at to it is not possible to predict the state at a later time ti. c) If two entities a and b are close to each other, then the state of a is influencing the state of b and vice versa. In the case of living organisms we might say that a and b modify each other's behaviour. For instance, the moving pattern of a single ant is known to be random, but if two ants are near each other they exchange the chemical pheromone which increases the likelihood that b starts moving if a is moving. This mutual modification of the state of the two entities is the local dynamics of the system, d) Even if the entities influence each other locally, the system is not deterministic, so there is a degree of freedom which means that the future state of an individual entity cannot be predicted, e) If there is a sufficiently large population the local dynamics will spread throughout the population and give rise to some kind of synchronised behaviour. This is the global dynamics of the system which gives rise to the emergent properties -i.e. the global order -of the system.
In the case of the anthill the local dynamics is so simple that it is possible to simulate the development of the global structure on a computer. The mutual modification and the synchronised behaviour ensure that there is cooperation in the anthill, but the degree of freedom is important as well, since this ensures that it is still possible to make new discoveries of food supplies, etc. For a detailed description of the phenomenon of emergent structure and the ant hill example, see Goodwin (1997) .
Another example, which does not consist of living organisms, is the brain considered as a dynamic system. The population is here the single neurons with an on-off firing activity. It is known that a neuron modifies a neighbouring neuron's firing pattern by releasing neurotransmitters that are ether excitatory or inhibitor}'. This constitutes the local dynamics of the system. It is possible to consider consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of this system. Sensory input gives activation locally in the respective sensory modules; for instance, visual input gives activation in VI, V2, etc. If the visibility of a visual stimulus is reduced by a technique of visual masking then the brain activity is more or less encapsulated in restricted areas of the brain; for instance, the primary visual areas, and the subject reports not seeing anything. However, there can still be a behavioural effect of the stimulus which is the so called subliminal priming effect. If, on the other hand, the subject is conscious of seeing the stimulus it is shown that there is a widespread activity in the brain, especially in the prefrontal cortex. This has given rise to the global workspace theory of consciousness according to which consciousness of stimulus depends on a global coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain; for details see Dehaene & Naccache (2001) . This is then the emergent global structure described in e) above. The notion of consciousness that is referred to in this example is consciousness of the content of a stimulus, which is then seen as an emergent property of the brain as a dynamic system. The notion of consciousness that I will refer to later in this paper is an agent's consciousness of her own behavioural strategy. This type of consciousness is seen as depending on a dynamic system that involves at least two brains. That is, it is the brain as a dynamic system activated when one individual meets another, so it is the brain dynamics embedded in an external "social" dynamics that is at stake. Before we get to that I will have to introduce the notions of schematic representation and of imitation.
Schematic representations
One important aspect of human cognition is the ability to act in a situation according to an abstract schematic representation, which is independent of the specific material manifestations and which therefore can be used in apparently very different scenarios in a flexible way. For instance, humans do not act according to an experientially based correlation between cause and effect, but instead according to some abstract understanding of the force-dynamic possibilities in the situation. This abstract representation is necessary for and also stimulates the ability to change strategy: since it is only the application of an abstract notion of "force" that matters, any behaviour that conforms to the schematic understanding of the situation will do. Humans are thus able to understand the dynamic possibilities in a specific situation based on a notion that is not visually or otherwise accessible to our senses. "Force" is an abstract invisible entity that is used by the human mind in order to construct models of the world with a view to manipulating the dynamic possibilities in specific scenarios.
There is evidence that humans differ from other primates in that regard. In an experiment described in Tomasello (1999: 22) , subjects catch hold of some food placed in a tube by using a stick. In the tube there is a trap so if the subjects try to pull the food towards the end where they are standing, the food disappears through a hole. However, if you know about gravity and the forcedynamics of sticks pushing objects, you should know how to avoid the trap and instead push the food out through the opposite opening of the tube. If this experiment is performed with chimps, they have about 70 trials where they push and pull by chance before they learn the correct strategy. Moreover, if you turn the tube around so the trap becomes harmless, they still use the learned behaviour even if an easier strategy could have been adopted. If two year old children are used in this experiment they immediately use the most optimal strategy in both cases.
This experiment shows that chimps do not have a mental representation of "hidden forces" that either have to be overcome or that can be used strategically. That does not prevent chimps from developing sophisticated strategies useful for acquiring food, but they are developed on a trial and error basis whereby the chimps can learn important correlations between cause and effect. Since there is no representation of a force, it is not possible to find new ways of representing the same force. Given an antecedent-consequent relation, they do not understand that many different antecedents might have the same consequent, and there is therefore no systematic and conceptually based development of tools. In other words, in the cases where animals do use tools this is dependent on an experientially developed correlation, probably developed through many instances of trial and error.
Humans on the other hand do have an abstract representation of "force". When humans manipulate the visually accessible physical world they do that on the basis of an underlying force-dynamic model which is not visible itself. There is therefore a crucial distinction between the overt behavioural strategy on the one hand, and the invisible dynamic schema on the other, meaning that different strategies might fit into the same schema. Humans can therefore change strategy according to their understanding of the forces needed to accomplish the task. For instance, if you want to lift an object you might try to use your hands. If that does not work you might get the idea to use your hands on a lever instead, thereby exploiting the fact that a small force at a greater distance to the pivot point can neutralize a greater force at a smaller distance. In other words, an understanding of abstract force-dynamic schémas, as those analyzed in Talmy (2000) , is a necessary condition for the development of tools.
Imitation and the mirror system
One of the cornerstones in Tomasello's theory of culture is the human disposition to imitate at all levels of human interaction, starting with neonates' tendency to imitate facial expressions and later shown in two-year old children's imitation of observed behavioural strategies relative to a goal. Imitation is different from mimicry in Tomasello's theory, since imitation is based on a conceptual understanding of the imitated behaviour, in contrast to mimicry. This is a bit similar to human's use of force as based on an "understanding" of force, in contrast to a behaviour that is based on an experienced correlation between forces accomplished through trial and error. Children's tendency to imitate any observed behaviour continues until about four years of age; from then on the propensity for imitating is counterbalanced by a propensity for doing things on one's own. The dialectic tension between imitation and nonimitation is a precondition for the development of culture. Imitation secures stability and the transfer of behaviour from generation to generation, so imitation ensures global stability in the dynamics of interaction. However, if imitation became too strong there would be no innovation and society would perish, a development that is counteracted by non-imitative behaviour which is the source for new ideas and new behavioural strategies, cf. point b) and d) in the description of the dynamics of emergent properties.
The development of an inclination to imitate might then be one of the changes in the local dynamics of interaction between two individuals which has a large scale effect on the social structure of the population and -as we shall see -on the development of certain meta-cognitive abilities as well. This change has to be correlated with changes in brain structure and it is likely that a sophisticated exploitation of the so-called system of mirror neurons in the brain has lead to the sophisticated forms of social interaction that we find amongst humans. In other words, if the local dynamics described in c) above can be identified on a phenomenological level as individuals imitating each other, then this overt behaviour is dependent on a micro-dynamics in the brain that is not phenomenologically accessible. The brain and its dynamics of mirror neurons corresponds then to the notion of "internal space" in catastrophe theory which determines the phenomenologically accessible macro structure in an "external space", cf. René Thom (1972) .
In the 1980s and the 1990s G. Rizzolatti found neurons in the inferior frontal cortex of the macaque monkey's brain that responded to the observa-tion of specific motor activity. For instance, there are neurons that only respond if the monkey observes a very specific type of activity, e.g. pinching a small object. However, there are other neurons that respond to more schematic types of motor activity -for instance, manually grasping an object -irrespective of how this is done. Yet other neurons are only active if there is an expected outcome of the observed activity. The mirror neurons thus constitute a complex neural system and there is no doubt that a similar system can be found in humans. Using brain imaging Jeannerod (2003) has found areas in the brain that are activated both when the subject observes another person perform an activity and when the same activity is self-generated. Moreover, the same areas are active when the subject imagines the activity and when it intends to perform the activity. These areas, which include parts of motor cortex, are likely to contain networks of cells that perform some of the same functions as the mirror neurons found in monkeys.
Since mirror neurons are not uniquely human, one cannot expect that there be a direct link between the mirror system and imitative behaviour as it is displayed at the phenomenological level. Mirror neurons -at least those found in monkeys -constitute a basic system that does not necessarily imply any conceptual representation of the mirrored behaviour, whereas this is the case for imitation. However, it is still possible that the mirror system is a nonconceptual foundation for the development of the uniquely human imitative behaviour. Gallese & Goldman (1998) have proposed a theory according to which the mirror neurons form a much more extended system in the human brain. According to this theory, mirror neurons are not just activated by observation of motor activity, but also on perceiving all sorts of expressive behaviour: speech, facial expressions, emotional expressions, etc. As we have seen, mirror neurons activated by observation of behaviour might support the development of a conceptual understanding of behavioural strategies, and similarly, this extended system, oriented toward expressivity, might support the development of the so-called theory of mind.
In any case, for instrumental behaviour the mirror neurons secure a fast, non-conceptual motor representation of the observed activity. That is, at a very basic level humans have an immediate embodied representation of the other's activity. By embodied I refer to the fact that the observation of a motor action will activate parts of the motor system that are activated if I myself had to carry out the observed activity.
Consider now the following situation: a child observes on two different occasions an adult using two different behavioural strategies for the same task. Due to the attention to the behaviour and the neural mirroring of it, the child will then have two different motor representadons of the behaviour necessary to achieve the same goal. This distinction might in itself enhance a development through which the child becomes able to distinguish between behavioural strategies, on the one hand, and the goal on the other. Anyhow, observations confirm that children develop this conceptual distinction from 9 month and onwards. Since the adult can achieve a goal in two different ways on two different occasions, this might lead to an understanding of the adult as one who makes behavioural choices relative to a given goal. Likewise, if the child is going to achieve the goal herself, she has two different motor representations for how to act relative to the task in question. The child will thus experience herself as making a behavioural choice. In both cases, the experience of the other as well as of the self as making behavioural choices is almost equivalent to experiencing the other and the self as intentional agents who act in the conscious mode. In other words, the separation of the behavioural strategy and the goal as different mental representations and the representation of different strategies for the same goal enforces a meta-cognitive stance towards acting. Again, I am not claiming that there is a direct link between mirror neurons and the experience of intentionality and consciousness, but the mirror system is likely to play a part in the conceptual distinction between the behavioural strategy and the goal, which then lead to the experience and thereby the representation of the other and self as intentional agents. But understanding the other as intentional is the same as having a representation of the other as one who acts according to a mental representation which is not visible itself and which is selected amongst many possible representations. This ties into the discussion on force presented above. Humans not only understand that other people are acting according to an invisible mental state selected amongst others, but also that the choice is determined in view of an objective to optimize the use of invisible forces.
The use of the word choice above does not necessarily refer to the ordinary meaning of that word. Rather I am referring to basic experiences that lay the foundation for what we understand as "making a choice". We can imagine that these experiences enhance the development of brain structure being used for changing strategies. If a person is using a bad strategy relative to a goal, and if she "knows" that different manipulations of forces might lead to the desired goal, and if she "knows" that the s tra teg}' used is one selected amongst many others, this might motivate a change of behaviour, and thereby the development of procedures for changing her strategy. It is known that monkeys are not very good at this. If they fail in achieving a goal they will often lose interest and attend to something else, whereas humans might stick to the goal and try to achieve it by other means. This correlates well with the knowledge we have that strategy change is processed in the frontal part of the brain and that the main differences in brain structure between monkeys and humans are in the frontal part -which is much bigger in humans and which is known to support many aspects of what we understand by "consciousness". It is clear that this development towards the ability of choosing among different force-dynamic manipulations, connected with an understanding of the force-dynamic affordances of the object world, will naturally lead to the manipulation of tools in view of obtaining the desired goals.
I want to emphasize once more that the described mechanisms based on mirror neurons and imitation constitute the local dynamics described in point c) above. It entails the development of meta-cognitive representations. The logic is very simple: if a person has two different embodied representations of how to achieve a goal, she has to compare and choose the one that is most appropriate. We can consider this as a meta-cognitive process involving more than just an automatic execution of an entrenched motor scheme. This process is part of a dynamic flow of representations, where by representation I refer to a pattern of neural activity. In Jeannerod & Gallagher (2002) , the authors propose that there is a hierarchy of such representations in relation to goal oriented behaviour. At the bottom of the hierarchy we have motor schemes. This is a neural mechanism securing that I "know" how to grasp a glass of water. It is probably at this level we find the mirror neurons. At least -as mentioned above -there are in the primates single neurons that are only active when the animal performs this kind of motor activity, with some neurons only responding to very specific motor activity and some having a more schematic response-field. The activation of the motor schemes at this level is automatic and unconscious and there is also an automatic and unconscious adjustment to small changes in the target object, cf. Jeannerod (2003) .
The motor schemes are embedded in neural networks that represent behavioural strategies relative to goals. This level includes what in cognitive linguistics is known as experiential schemes; cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1999) . For instance, if I am thirsty, my goal is to get some water. A strategy for achieving this is to go to the kitchen, take a glass from the shelf, open the tap, pour water into the glass, etc. This is an experiential scheme which is generally also activated automatically and unconsciously. The experiential schema is built up by means of a series of specific motor actions. On observing the behaviour of a conspecific, a motor action can be understood to the extent it can be simulated in the mirror system of the observer and embedded in an experiential scheme. This also goes for material objects: they can be understood to the extent we can simulate an interaction with them relative to an experiential scheme. In other words this is an embodied theory of the meaning of material objects.
The structures of the brain responsible for making choices can be considered as part of a meta-cognitive system, but in ongoing behaviour this system is only activated if something fails. As mentioned above, the experiential schemes are executed more or less automatically without any specific awareness, but they are accessible to consciousness if something goes wrong or if an unexpected obstacle suddenly appears. The main occupation of the brain is to predict the outcome of either perceived action or self-generated action. As long as the sensory-motor feedback information does not deviate too much from the predicted outcome everything works in an automatic mode. But if the predictions fail, then another system in the brain is activated. This is the metacognitive system activating a conscious assessment of the failed strategy relative to the goal and possibly comparing it to alternative strategies. It is important in this regard that for humans the prediction is related to an awareness of the strategy, because other primates are also occupied with predicting, but here there is no conscious awareness of the strategy; their attention is goal oriented and therefore a failed prediction does not necessarily lead to a change in strategy.
Culture
The main idea in Tomasello (1999) is to explain the cultural diversity as a result of a general cognitive disposition rather than as a result of the development of specific modules in the brain: tool making, symbolic expressions, paintings, decorations, language, mathematics, etc. are thus seen as developing from minimal changes in human interaction. In this paper I have argued that we can include certain meta-cognitive abilities in this list, such as the ability to change from an automatic mode of behaviour to a conscious mode in cases where a given behavioural strategy fails. One of crucial changes in the evolution of primates is the disposition to imitate conspecifics, based on a schematic understanding of behaviour. In experiments with chimps and eighteen-monthold infants where the experimenter shows good or bad strategies for achieving a goal, the chimps do not imitate the strategy of the experimenter. They are goal oriented and try to solve the problem in their own manner. The children, on the other hand, imitate what they observe, irrespective of whether it is a good or a bad strategy for obtaining the goal, Tomasello (1999: 83) . Apparendy the children are less inventive than the chimps, but the advantage of the behaviour they display is that if an individual in the human society begins to solve a problem in a new and more efficient way, then this new behaviour will quickly spread in the community and even be transmitted to the next generation. In the chimps' community the new invention is likely to die out with the inventor, so it is clear that for the development of cultural diversity imitation is a necessary condition.
Imitation is not only related to an experimental manipulation of the object world. There is also an extended imitation of all sorts of expressive gestures, cf. Gallese & Goldman (1998) . This is connected with an emergent understanding of the expression as something that refers to a mental state. In some cases this reference is also intended; for instance, a sound pattern might be interpreted as the expression of an intention concerning the attention of the hearer: the sound maker has a mental representation to which she wants the hearer to attend. Due to the imitation mechanism (the mirror system), the perceiver of the expressive behaviour will imitate it and express a similar mental state of her own. The dynamics of this interaction might lead to a stable sign system. It seems in any case that imitation and the development of sophisticated expressive behaviour lead to a situation where the individuals in the community try to share their mental states. Any expression is interpreted as information about a mental state and likewise the interpreter imitates this by expressing her own mental state in a similar manner. This mechanism might be transferred to symbolic artefacts. Paintings, decorations etc. are aspects of expressive behaviour. When people of the same tribe meet they exchange expressive signs just to mark that they are part of the same community and share the same fate. Likewise, symbolic artefacts may be exchanged and shared in the community in order to symbolize that the members are part of the same community and have access to each other's mind.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to relate imitation to an extended use of the mirror system in the brain. This modification of the mirror system is then a minimal change in the brain that at the phenomenological level changes the mutual behavioural modification that takes place whenever two individuals of the same species meet. This local dynamics of mutual imitations constitute a dynamic system with large scale emergent phenomena. Imitation reinforces and is connected to an emergent understanding of the difference between the behavioural strategy and the goal, which enforces the development of a system for making behavioural choices, essentially in the frontal parts of the brain. This system already implies some meta-cognitive abilities whereby the subject can choose the most appropriate strategy, especially in cases where the automatic mode of behaviour breaks down because a given strategy does not come up to the expected result. The system for making behavioural choices is thus strongly connected to the conscious mode of activity. This development of metacognitive strategies of course further enhances a tool making process and thereby the development of a material culture with a big diversity in skills and behaviour.
